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increased  by  the  large  use  of  foreign  borrowing  and  the  preference  of 
external lenders for government entities and government guarantees. 
Heavy  state involvement in  the financial sector encouraged the govern- 
ment  to use public financial institutions for fiscal purposes. The corporate 
rescue operations of the early 1980s were conducted primarily through PNB, 
DBP,  GSIS, and indirectly through the central bank. This had the effect of 
hiding  the  true  cost  of  the  rescue  operations,  as  well  as  substantially 
weakening the portfolios of  the major financial institutions.  By  1985 and 
1986 the  fiscal  problem  would  be  primarily a  public  financial  institution 
problem, as we will explain in detail in chapter 7. 
Philippine financial markets contributed to the debt crisis; they also made 
adjustment to the crisis more difficult, as government demands for financial 
resources nearly  starved the  private  sector  in  the  adjustment episode.  In 
chapter 7 we  take up the adjustment period  in detail,  but before that  we 
examine the  one  remaining piece  of  the  Philippine debt  crisis  story, the 
accumulation and management of the external debt. 
6  External Debt and Debt 
Management 
The 1970s opened with an external debt crisis in the Philippines that was in 
some ways similar to the current crisis. Expansionary policy during the first 
Marcos  administration,  coupled  with  heavy  external  borrowing  on  short 
term, led to the crisis. The debt/GNP ratio for the Philippines rose from 10 
percent in  1965 to 22 percent by  1969, and debt maturing within the next 
year amounted to one quarter of total external debt. In tandem with an IMF 
stabilization program  and  a  float  of  the  peso,  the  Philippines negotiated 
longer maturities for much of  the outstanding short-term debt of the public 
sector. 
The crisis led to a number of changes in external debt policy. Republic Act 
6142 (November 1970) established a comprehensive system of  control and 
information for foreign borrowing. Under the system all external borrowing 
by  the  public  or  the  private  sector,  except  short-term  borrowing  by  the 
commercial banking sector, required prior approval of the Monetary Board. 
The Management of  External Debts and  Investment Accounts Department 
(MEDIAD) was  set up  within  the central bank  to  screen applications for 
external borrowing. Applicants were required to submit information on the 
proposed project  and  its likely returns,  as well  as details of  the financing 
involved. The central bank could, and did, set minimum requirements for 504  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
maturities and grace periods,  as well as maximum interest rates and spreads 
on foreign loans. All transactions on external loans-drawings, interest  and 
principal  payments,  and  refinancings-had  to  be  reported  to  MEDIAD, 
which maintained  statistics on Philippine external debt. 
In addition to the approval and reporting requirements,  the act established 
a  statutory  limitation  on  debt  service,  and  therefore  implicitly,  on  total 
external indebtedness. Debt service payments were not to exceed 20 percent 
of average foreign exchange inflows of the three preceding years. In 1970 the 
Philippines was above this level, but the statutory limitation was achieved by 
1972. 
The monitoring  and control system covered all nonmonetary debt, defined 
to include all direct borrowings of  the nonbanking  sector and medium- and 
long-term  funds  borrowed  by  the  banking  sector  and  then  lent  on to the 
nonbanking  sector.  Short-term liabilities  of  the  banking  sector  were  not 
under the control of  MEDIAD and were not generally included in Philippine 
debt statistics prepared before the  1980s.’ In fact, external borrowing by the 
banking  sector  has  generally  been  encouraged  through  the  swap facilities 
made  available to  commercial  banks  by  the  central  bank  and  through  the 
Foreign Currency Deposit System. 
The Foreign Currency Deposit  System was established in  1970 to  attract 
offshore funds,  including those held by  Philippine residents,  to the country 
and  to  develop the  Philippines  as a financial  center.  Subsequent  modifica- 
tions of the rules governing the system in 1976 led to rapid growth in the rest 
of  the decade. Under the Foreign Currency Deposit System domestic banks 
were  allowed  to  create  separate  accounting  units  called  foreign  currency 
deposit units (FCDUs), which could accept deposits in foreign currency from 
residents  or nonresidents.  Secret  accounts  were  permissible,  and  deposits 
could  be  withdrawn  and  transferred  out of  the  country  without  restriction. 
FCDUs could make foreign currency loans to residents or nonresidents and 
could make peso loans by exchanging foreign currency with the central bank 
under  its  swap fa~ilities.~  FCDUs were  considered  part  of  the  Philippine 
banking  system,  and  their  liabilities  were  included  in  (banking  system) 
external debt. This was the case even if  the deposits came from Philippine 
residents. The liabilities of  FCDUs grew rapidly  in the late  1970s and early 
1980s to a level of  just over $8 billion  in  1983.4 
In addition to the Foreign Currency Deposit System, which was restricted 
to domestic and foreign-owned commercial  banks operating  in the country, 
provisions  were  made  for  foreign  commercial  banks  to  set  up  offshore 
banking units (OBUs)  in the Philippines.  These units could accept foreign 
currency  deposits from external  sources and  make loans to nonresidents of 
the  Philippines,  with  minimal  restrictions  by  the  central  bank.  Lending  to 
Philippine residents in foreign currency was also permissible,  but had to be 
approved  by  the  central  bank  as a  regular  external  borrowing.  OBUs are 
treated  as foreign  commercial  banks by  the  Philippines,  and  their loans to 505  PhilippineKhapter 6 
domestic  residents,  but  not  their  liabilities,  are  included  in  Philippine 
external debt. 
6.1  External Borrowing in the 1970s 
Summary  figures on Philippine external  debt  are presented  in table 6.1. 
The impact of  the successful adjustment period  in the early  1970s is clearly 
seen  in  the  debt  figures  in  the  table.  The  current  account  improved 
dramatically during these years and registered a surplus of 5 percent of GNP 
in  1973. Nonmonetary external debt grew modestly,  and both the debt/GNP 
and  debt/export  ratios  fell  dramatically.  Maturities  on  nonmonetary  debt 
lengthened, although the share of short-term debt in the total external debt of 
the Philippines  increased as the banking  sector resumed  normal  operations 
and banking sector liabilities grew. 
The next four years,  1974-78,  saw a surge in foreign  borrowing  in the 
Philippines,  a consequence of the first oil shock and the acceleration of  the 
country’s  development  program.  Outstanding  nonmonetary  debt  tripled 
during this period. The growth in real terms was substantially less because of 
inflation,  but  both  the  debt/GNP  and  the  debt/export  ratios  increased 
considerably.  By the end of the  1970s, indicators of Philippine foreign debt 
had  reached  high but certainly  not  alarming levels.  The debt/GNP ratio in 
the Philippines in  1979 was comparable to that of Korea and Indonesia and 
somewhat  below  the  Latin  American  average.  The Philippine  debuexport 
ratio  was well  above Korea’s,  but  well  below  most of  Latin  America  (see 
table 6.6 below). 
Several  changes  in  the  characteristics  of  Philippine  debt  took  place 
during the  last half  of  the  1970s. The first was  a marked  shift in  external 
borrowing  toward  the  public  sector.  After  falling  in  the  early  1970s, the 
share of  public  sector debt rose sharply, reaching  two-thirds by  the end of 
the decade (table 6.2). 
As was the case for other LDC borrowers during the  1970s, there was a 
shift  in  the  Philippines  toward  commercial  sources  of  finance  and  toward 
debt with floating interest rates. Between  1976 and  1980 the share of banks 
and other financial institutions in the Philippine credit mix rose to just over 
half,  shown  in  table  6.3. But  the  Philippines  put  considerable  effort into 
diversifying its  sources of  finance.  One source  was  the  international  bond 
market,  which  the  Philippines tapped  for about  10  percent  of  its medium- 
and long-term funding. The Philippines also assiduously courted multilateral 
and  bilateral  sources  during  the  1970s, receiving  an increasing  share  of 
funding from these two. Major official sources for the Philippines were the 
World  Bank,  the  Asian  Development  Bank,  and  the  U.S. and  Japanese 
governments.  Creditor  breakdowns  for  earlier  years  in  the  1970s  are 
available for medium- and long-term debt of the public sector and show the 
same  patterns  (table 6.4). Aid  from  official  sources  was  largely  coursed Table 6.1  Philippine External Debt (in millions of US.  dollars) 
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Source:  Philippine  central bank. MEDIAD and Financial Plan Data Center. Table 6.2  Philippine Nonmonetary External Debt, Public and Private Sector 
(in millions of  US.  dollars and percentages) 
1970  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1978  1979 
Private sector debt 
Medium & long term  919  983  1,041  1,213  1.411  1.812  2,091  2,072 
Short term  I75  297  262  320  409  568  936  1,247 
Public sector debt 
Medium & long term  75  1  762  845  1.048  I .3  I6  2.120  4,192  5.211 
IMF obligations  I08  145  I39  131  238  450  626  718 
Short term  184  23  19  II  28  147  321  566 
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Source:  Central hank, MEDIAD 
Note:  The classification system for nonmonetary debt differs slightly starting in  1986. Figures for 1985 and earlier are approximately.  hut 
not strictly, comparable Table 6.3  Nonmonetary Medium- and Long-term Debt Characteristics (percentage shares) 
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Source:  Central bank, MEDIAD. Data on total external debt from the central bank, Financial Plan Data Center 511  Philippines/Chapter 6 
Table 6.4  Public Sector Medium- and Long-Term Debt by  Creditor (in millions of U.S. 
dollars and percentages) 
1970  1975  1979  1980  1981  1982 
Total medium- & long-term debt  1,491  2,789  7,230  8,918  10,338  11,992 
Public sector  572  1,377  5,159  6,464  7,578  8,836 
Percent shares: 
Multilateral  21.0  24.6  22.9  23.2  26.5  26.0 
Bilateral  19.4  39.1  21.9  19.7  19.3  17.5 
Bonds  I .9  I .6  15.2  13.9  11.2  9.9 
Financial institutions  46.7  29.5  35.2  38.7  38.9  42.9 
Supplier credits  10.9  5.1  4.9  4.5  4.0  3.7 
Source;  World Bank (1984a).  table A.8 
Nore: This table is based on an older data series which has since been revised. Comparable breakdowns from 
revised data are not available. 
through  the  public  sector,  and  thus  has  a  much  larger  share  among  the 
creditors shown in table 6.4. 
As we point out in table 6.3, the  proportion  of Philippine  medium-  and 
long-term  debt at floating interest rates doubled to 37 percent by the end of 
the decade. However, the use of floating rate debt was not as extensive in the 
Philippines as it was in other medium income countries, and at 40 percent in 
the  early  1980s  it  was  well  below  that  of  Latin  American  debtors.  The 
Philippines was also able to make  heavier  use  of bilateral  and  multilateral 
loans than were Latin American debtors,  where the share of  debt to official 
creditors averaged  18 per~ent.~ 
Philippine authorities paid close attention to debt management during most 
of  the  1970s.  Short-term debt  as a  proportion  of  nonmonetary  debt  was 
reduced  steadily  until  the  mid- 1970s,  particularly  short-term  debt  of  the 
public  sector.  Within  medium- and long-term  debt, there was a continuing 
shift toward  longer maturities (see table 6.3). The Philippines also used the 
opportunities presented  in  1978 and  1979 to refinance a portion of existing 
loans and lengthen  maturities.  By  the  late  1970s, the  average  maturity on 
fixed term credits was just over  13 years.6 
Although  it  is  difficult  to  measure  or prove,  the  Philippines  probably 
received better terms on foreign borrowing through the minimum terms and 
queuing that were enforced through the approval  process.  In order to limit 
the number of  approaches to the market, the central bank borrowed in large 
amounts  in  its  own  name  for  smaller  and  less  well-known  Philippine 
applicants.  Through  this  Consolidated  Foreign  Borrowing  Program.  the 
central  bank  borrowed  $2.4  billion  between  1978  and  1983.  About 
two-thirds of the funds raised went to public sector entities (including DBP) 
and  the  rest  to  private  sector   applicant^.^  Although  the  loans  carried  the 512  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
guarantee  of  the central  bank, the foreign  exchange risk  was borne  by  the 
ultimate recipients of the loans. 
Although  no  single  indicator  adequately  describes  the  burden  and  risk 
associated with a given level of external debt, the most common one used is 
the  ratio  of  debt  service  payments  to export earnings.  Despite  the  rapid 
accumulation  of  external  debt  during  the  1970s,  there  was  only  slight 
movement  of  the  Philippine  debt service ratio (defined here  as  interest on 
nonmonetary  debt,  plus  principal  repayments on  medium-  and  long-term 
debt  divided  by  exports  of  goods  and  services).  The  debt  service  ratio 
declined  from a level of  30 percent  in  1970 to below  20 percent  by  1973 
(table 6.5). The ratio varied  somewhat, but maintained  a level  of about  18 
percent  between  1975  and  1980.  International  comparisons,  using  a 
definition of the debt service ratio that does not include service exports, are 
shown in  table  6.6.  Here  the  Philippines  shows up  with  high  debt  ratios 
relative  to the other Asian  countries, but  generally  moderate  ratios  when 
comparisons  are made  to Latin  American  countries or other LDCs outside 
the region.  At the end of  the  1970s the Philippines was a high external debt 
country but, on macro indicators, not a worrisome one. 
A  second  debt  service  ratio, unique to the  Philippines,  is  important in 
discussing Philippine debt. This ratio was defined by  Republic  Act 6142 in 
1970 and influenced, and to some extent constrained, Philippine behavior. In 
addition,  it  may  have  misled  domestic  policymakers  and external  creditors 
about the debt risk of the Philippines. The statute limited total debt service 
payments  to less  than  20 percent  of  total  foreign exchange receipts.  The 
numerator in this statutory debt service ratio included principal and interest 
payments on medium- and long-term debt, IMF obligations, and short-term 
debt  of  fixed  maturity.  The definition  excluded  debt  service  on revolving 
credits  and  on  short-term  banking  system  liabilities.  The  denominator 
included all external receipts on a cash basis, including capital inflows, SDR 
allocations, and monetization of gold. In the original ratio, foreign exchange 
receipts  were  to  be  the  average of  the  three preceding  years, but  this  was 
later amended by presidential decree to refer to just the preceding  year. 
The statutory  debt  service  ratio  was  unusual  in  that  it  included  capital 
inflows as well as current earnings in the denominator.  What this meant was 
that additional foreign borrowing  could actually lower the statutory ratio in 
the following year, if the interest rate plus rate of amortization was below the 
current  level of  the  statutory  ratio.  In  addition, the statutory  ratio  left  out 
short-term revolving credits, which became a major part of debt accumula- 
tion  in the  1980s. The statutory ratio tracked the conventional  debt service 
ratio closely during the  1970s, as shown in table 6.5, but the two measures 
diverged  greatly  during  the  1980s.  Between  1980 and  1982,  when  the 
conventional debt service ratio almost doubled, the statutory ratio increased 
by  a mere 4 percent. Table 6.5  Debt Service on Philippine External Debt (in millions of  U.S.  dollars and percentages) 
1970  1972  1973  1974  I975  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987 
Medium- & 
long-term debt 
Principal  271  264  378  369  355  378  545  634  692  794  1,060  1,119  1,225  713  890  1,027 
Interest  115  120  125  I52  234  236  440  626  975  1,374  1,990  1,985  2,257  2,208  2,046  2,226 
Total debt service  386  384  503  521  589  614  985  1,260  1,667  2,168  3,050  3,104  3,482  2,921  2,936  3,253 
Debt service ratio 
As Z of  exports of 
goodsandservices  29.2  26.4  19.9  14.6  18.4  14.5  20.1  20.1  20.8  25.2  38.1  38.2  43.4  36.9  34.0  35.3 
Statutorily defined  34  19  20  20  17  13.7  18  18.6  18.7  19.7  19.4  19.1  na  na  na  na 
debt service  29.8  31.3  24.9  29.2  39.7  38.4  44.7  49.7  58.5  63.4  65.2  63.9  64.8  75.6  69.7  68.4 
Interest as % of 
Source: Central bank.  MEDIAD and Financial Plan Data Center. 514  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
Table 6.6  Comparative Debt Ratios, 1979 and 1986 
1979  1986 
Debt Service on 
Total  Debt Service  MLT Debtd/  MLT Debt" as % 









































































Chile  120.1 
Malaysia  77.0 
Mexico  16.1 
Philippines  72.2 
Israel  72. I 
Venezuela  66.9 
Egypt  58.8 
Argentina  51.7 
Peru  50.5 
Indonesia  49.7 
Bangladesh  47.5 
Turkey  42.3 
Brazil  37.6 
Korea  36.1 
Pakistan  36.0 
Thailand  35.2 
Algeria  24.8 
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Source  Campbell (1982). dnd  World  Bank, World Debt Tables  1980 and World Developmenr Report  1981. 
1988 
"Medium- and long-term debt 
bNonoil cxporting less developed countries 
6.2  Foreign Borrowing and Debt Management in the 1980s 
The relatively  sanguine position of  the Philippines at the end of  the 1970s 
changed extremely rapidly during the early 1980s.The current account deficit 
widened sharply as the second oil price shock, the fall in commodity prices, 
and  the  rise  in  world  real  interest  rates  hit  the  country.  Once again  the 
Philippines  adopted  a countercyclical  policy,  increasing  the  public  invest- 
ment  program  to  maintain  domestic  incomes.  The budget  deficit  swelled 
further as a a result of rescue operations  mounted  for domestic firms in  the 
wake of  the Dewey Dee crisis and the failure of crony and capital-intensive 
firms. 
This was also a period of increasing opposition to the Marcos regime. A 
number of  protests and bombings  occurred  in  1980, and a wave of  strikes 
took  place  after  the  lifting of  martial  law  in  early  1981. Capital  flight,  a 
continual phenomenon in the  1970s, increased dramatically in  1981. Errors 
and  omissions  in  the  balance  of  payments  turned  sharply  negative  in  that 
year, a $500 million dollar turnaround from 1980 equivalent to 35  percent of 
the capital account. 515  PhilippinedChapter 6 
The combined result of these events was a very rapid increase in external 
debt during a period of much higher real  interest rates. The debt/GNP ratio 
rose from 35 percent in 1980 to 56 percent in 1983. The debt service ratio, 
which  had  remained  almost  constant  during  the  last  half  of  the  1970s, 
skyrocketed from 1980 to 1983; it jumped from 21 to 38 percent, making the 
Philippines an obvious problem debtor. 
Four factors explain the extraordinary rise of the debt service ratio during 
the early  1980s. The first is the increase in world interest rates. In  1980 47 
percent  of  Philippine  nonmonetary  debt  was  short-term  debt  or  debt 
contracted at floating interest rates.'  As world interest rates rose, so did debt 
service. One rough  measure of  this  effect is interest payments  during the 
year divided by  the average level of  outstanding debt during the year; this 
rose from 5.7 percent in  1979 to 9.5 percent in  1982. 
The second reason behind the sharp rise in the debt service ratio was a 
reduction in  export earnings.  Between  1981 and  1982 the dollar value of 
goods and services exports fell by 7 percent after having risen by  an average 
of  14 percent per year from  1974 to  1980. Export receipts increased only 
slightly  during  1983 and  then  fell  again  during  1984.  The  decline  was 
sharpest for merchandise exports, which  fell by  14 percent between  1980 
and 1983. Service receipts, which accounted for almost one-third of  exports, 
leveled off in  1981. The Philippines was hit by the appreciation of the U.S. 
dollar,  which  weakened  international commodity  prices  in  dollar  terms. 
There was  little relief  on the debt  side,  since three-quarters of  Philippine 
external debt was  in  dollars and  most of  the rest  in  Japanese yen,  also a 
relatively strong currency (table 6.7). 
Table 6.7  Philippines Fixed-term, Nonmonetary External Debt by  Currency of 
Repayment (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
1979  1980  I98  1  1982  1983  1  984a  1985b 
US.  dollar  6,016.5  7.412.7  8,895.1  10,343.5  11.902.4  11,931.3  13,163.9 
Deutsche mark  194.3  163.7  138.2  164.5  230.7  218.0  183.2 
Japanese yen  1,320.7  1,558.5  1,824.4  1,987.8  2,402.7  2,630.3  2,458.9 
Pound sterling  106.3  98.7  102  74.9  44.2  77.1  50.6 
French franc  252.7  238.2  176.7  172.1  88.1  133.7  80.0 
Others  224.4  237.8  235.9  340.0  466.5  737.6  561.4 
Total  8,114.9  9,709.6  11,372.3  13,082.8  15,134.6  15,728.0  16,501.0 
Percentages: 
U.S. dollar  74.1  76.3  78.2  79.1  78.6  75.9  79.8 
Deutsche mark  2.4  1.7  1.2  1.3  1.5  1.4  1.1 
Japanese yen  16.3  16.1  16.0  15.2  15.9  16.7  14.9 
Pound sterling  1.3  1 .o  0.9  0.6  0.3  0.5  0.3 
French franc  3. I  2.5  I .6  1.3  0.6  0.9  0.5 
Others  2.8  2.4  2.  I  2.6  3.1  4.7  3.4 
Source: Central bank, MEDIAD. 
"Excludes short-term loans ($144  million total in  1984) 
bExcludes short-term loans, and excludes Central Bank assumed obligations amounting to $266 million. 516  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
But Philippine external borrowing increased to a much greater extent than 
indicated  by  the  worsening  of  the  current  account  deficit,  as  domestic 
residents  shifted  their own capital  overseas.  Capital  flight has  long been  a 
feature of the Philippine economy, but the scale increased dramatically in the 
early  1980s in response to domestic political  and economic uncertainty  and 
the increasing  overvaluation of  the Philippine peso.  In table 6.8 we present 
two measures of capital flight in the Philippines.  The first (col.  1-5)  is the 
gap  between  total  external  borrowing  and  the  recorded  uses  of  foreign 
exchange  in the  Philippine economy.  The second  measure  (col.  6-7)  is a 
narrower definition and includes only errors and omissions from the balance 
of  payments.'  Both  measures  show  a  sharp  increase  in  capital  outflows 
starting  in  1981, two  years before  the  Philippines  declared  a moratorium. 
During  1981 and  1982 the difference between  total  external borrowing and 
identified  uses  of  foreign exchange  reached  $1.85 billion  per  year,  or 3.4 
percent of GNP. 
The measures in table 6.8 understate the true extent of capital flight in the 
Philippines,  since  much  of  it  has  occurred  through  manipulation  of  trade 
invoices, primarily underinvoicing of exports. Comparing recorded exports 
of the Philippines and imports from the Philippines as recorded by its trading 
partners  shows  a  similar  increase  in  capital  flight  starting  in  1980  and 
averaging approximately  $690 million a year (1.3 percent of GNP) for 1980 
Table 6.8  Philippine Capital Flight, Balance of Payments Measures 
(in millions of  U.S. dollars) 
Other 
External  Current  Uses of  Cumulative 
Increase  Deficit  Exchange"  Outflow  Outflow  Omissions  Cumulative 
Debt  Account  Foreign  Capital  Capital  Errors and 
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Source:  Dohner ( l987), table 1. 
"Increase  in  central  bank  reserves  and  banking  system  foreign  assets,  less  net  inflow of  foreign  direct 
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through  1982."  What is interesting about all of the measures is that capital 
flight accelerated in the early 1980s, well before the Aquino assassination in 
1983. In  fact,  the  measures  in  table  6.8  and  trade  invoice  comparisons 
indicate that capital flight diminished  in  1983. 
The  exodus  of  capital  from  the  Philippines  occurred  for  a  variety  of 
reasons.  Political  uncertainty  heightened  in  the  early  1980s  due  to  the 
increased strength of the communist New People's Army and questions about 
Marcos'  health and presidential succession. The increasing business influence 
of Marcos and his cronies and their aggressive actions to take over successful 
domestic enterprises led businessmen  to transfer funds out of the country. In 
addition, there were the more conventional economic motivations for capital 
flight-a  desire to earn higher real returns on financial investment, anticipate 
devaluation,  or avoid domestic taxation. I' 
In table 6.9 we compare capital  flight  in the Philippines  to that  of  other 
LDC  debtors.  Although  capital  flight  was  not  the  driving  force  in  the 
Philippines that it was in Argentina and Venezuela,  it did play an important 
role during the period of debt accumulation, accounting for about one-third 
of the total debt buildup.  And the acceleration  of capital flight in the early 
1980s was part of  what swept the Philippines  into crisis. 
The final factor contributing to the sharp rise in the Philippine debt service 
burden  was  a  surge  in  short-term borrowing  in  the late  1970s and  early 
1980s. During this period  short-term debt grew from 15 to over 25 percent 
of nonmonetary  debt. These loans were contracted  at high interest rates and 
left the country  vulnerable  to shifts in external  confidence.  After declining 
steadily  in  importance  during  the  early  part  of  the  1970s,  short-term, 
nonmonetary debt began to rise after 1976 (table 6.10). Most short-term debt 
was  in  the  form  of  revolving  credits,  and  open  accounts  (O/A)  and 
documents against acceptance (D/A) used in trade finance. 
Acceleration of the payments schedule by international oil companies after 
the second oil price shock forced the Philippines to use bank financing for oil 
imports and  was responsible  for much  of  the growth  in  short-term credit. 
Table 6.9  Capital Flight in Selected LDC Debtors (in billions of  U.S.  dollars) 
Increase in  Capital Flight 
Capital Flight,  External Debt,  as 70 of Debt 
1976-82  1976-82  Accumulation 
Philippines  7.3  19.7  37% 
Argentina  25.3  34.1  74 
Brazil  12.6  65.9  19 
Korea  6.1  28.4  21 
Mexico  36. I  67.9  53 
Venezuela  20.5  26.3  78 
Source: Cumby and Levich (1987). table  I  (using Erbe definition of  capital  flight). Table 6.10  Short-term Nonmonetary Debt by Sector (in millions of U.S. dollars) 












as % of  total 
nonmonetary debt 
Distribution of 
short-term  debt (%) 
Private 
Public 
Short-term debt as % 

















14.  I 
19.5 
294  273 
249  254 
45  19 
26  9 
320  281 
272  262 
49  19 
2,210  2,306 
1,255  1,303 
956  1,003 
14.5  12.2 
84.8  93.2 
15.2  6.8 
21.6  20.1 
















312  571  1.197  1,618 
283  424  927  1,130 
29  147  270  489 
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438  715  1,357  1,813 
409  568  1,036  1,254 
29  141  321  559 
3,403  5,099  8,166  9,814 
1,820  2,380  4,028  4,392 
1,582  2,719  4,139  5,423 
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3,552  3,919  3,968  4,038  2,925 
1,827  1,824  2,041  2,100  1.978 
1,725  2,096  1,926  1,938  948 
I12  74  45  144  142 
3,664  3,993  4,013  4.182  3,068 
1,903  1,897  2,045  2,104  1,981 
1,761  2,096  1,968  2,078  1,087 
14,898  17,471  19,145  20,013  20,358 
6,386  7,234  6,976  6,703  6,686 
8,512  10,237  12,169  13,310  13,672 
24.6  22.9  21.0  20.9  15.1 
51.9  47.5  51.0  50.3  64.6 
48. I  52.5  49.0  49.7  35.4 
29.8  26.2  29.3  31.4  29.6 
20.7  20.5  16.2  15.6  8.0  - 
Source:  Central bank, MEDIAD. 519  PhilippineKhapter 6 
However, particularly in  1981 and  1982, the growth of revolving credit was 
not  trade  related  but  was  used  to  replace  maturing  long-term  credits, 
particularly by public sector enterprises.  Oil import financing was also used 
to provide credit for other purposes.  By  1982 outstanding oil import credits 
had risen to 85 percent of annual oil imports, although the financing period 
of  the  transactions  was  less than  six months.  Both  PNOC and  the  central 
bank were involved in oil import financing on a partly overlapping basis. 
Although  both  private  and  public  short-term borrowings  increased,  the 
growth of  short-term  debt  was  concentrated  in  the  public  sector.  Between 
1980 and  1982,  two-thirds  of  the  increase  in  short-term debt  came from 
public sector borrowings. As a result the public sector, which had accounted 
for as little as 3 percent of total short-term indebtedness,  accounted for over 
half in  1982,. 
The vulnerability  entailed  in relying on short-term debt became clear in 
1983. As anxieties about the Philippines built up during late 1982 and 1983, 
foreign banks began to reduce their exposure to the country. Between the end 
of 1982 and the end of 1983, short-term nonmonetary debt outstanding to the 
Philippines fell by  9 percent  (table 6.1), forcing  a rapid  exhaustion  of the 
nation’s reserves. l2 
6.3  Banking System Liabilities and International Reserves 
As  explained  above,  short-term  debt  of  the  banking  system  was  not 
included  within  the  external  debt  monitoring  and  approval  process  of 
MEDIAD and the central bank. Banks were generally encouraged to borrow 
in  foreign  currency  through  the  Foreign  Currency  Deposit  System  and 
through the swap facilities that the central bank provided.  Over the last half 
of  the  1970s, commercial  bank  external  liabilities  grew  steadily  from $1 
billion  in  1975 to $3.7  billion  in  1980 (table 6.11). The commercial banks 
were  continually  net  borrowers,  but  during  the  1970s  the  central  bank 
maintained  foreign currency assets large enough to give the banking system 
a net asset position of about 3 percent of GNP. Foreign currency reserves of 
the central bank were maintained at a level of about four months’ worth of 
imports. 
In order to finance a widening payments balance in the  1980s, the central 
bank  reduced  its  reserve  holdings.  It  also  incurred  additional  foreign 
currency liabilities by  borrowing  from the banking sector and by swapping 
pesos for foreign exchange. As a result the banking sector, which had shown 
a net asset position up to 1980, registered  increasing net liabilities, reaching 
7  percent  of  GNP and  16 percent  of  nonmonetary  debt by  1982. Capital 
flight  accelerated  during  the  last  part  of  1982,  leading  to  a  precipitous 
decline  in  central  bank  reserves.  By  September  1983 total  reserves  were 
below $700 million, or less than 4 percent of annual imports (table 6.12). 520  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intat, Jr. 
Table 6.11  Gross and Net Foreign Liabilities of  the Banking Sector 
(in millions of U.S. dollars) 
Gross Liabilities  Assets 
Central  Commercial 
Year  Bank  Banks  Total 
1975  527  990  1.517 
1976  566  1,082  1,648 
I977  39  1,419  1,458 
1978  152  2,353  2,505 
Central  Commercial 
Bank  Banks  Total 
1,361  719  2,079 
1,642  564  2,205 
1,525  738  2,264 



















2,979  3.453  2,423 
3,687  4.934  3.155 
4,410  5.903  2.574 
4,870  7.076  1.711 
4,526  7.216  865 
4.217  6,973  886 
3,338  6,235  1,061 
3,089  6.462  2,459 
3.491  6.176  1.959 
Net Liabilities 
Central  Commercial 
Bank  Banks  Total 
-  834  272  -562 
-  1.076  518  -558 
-  1,486  680  -806 
-  1.731  1,041  -690 
1.309  3,732  - 
1.904  5,059  - 
2,297  4,871  - 
2,540  4,251 
1,655  2,520 
1,837  2,723 
1.915  2,976 
1,986  4.445 
2,464  4,423 
.949  1.670  -279 
,908  1,783  -  125 
,081  2.113  1,032 
495  2,330  2,825 
,825  2,871  4,696 
,810  2,440  4.250 
,836  1.423  3.259 
914  1.103  2,017 
726  1,027  1,753 
Source:  IMF. Rerenr Economic Developments:  1985, table  14. and 1988. p. 46, table  I  I 
The deteriorating reserve position of the central bank was not known at the 
time, for published  reserve figures substantially overstated  the true reserves 
of  the  central  bank.  In  transactions  involving  the PNOC  and  the  London 
branch  of  PNB,  the  central  bank  lent  and  reborrowed  existing  reserves, 
counting  them  twice  in reserve  statistics.  The published  reserve  figures of 
the central bank  and the later, audited figures are shown in table 6.12. The 
reserve overstatement varied from month to month, but averaged about $600 
million.  The existence  of  the overstatement  was  discovered  in  December 
1983, after the declaration  of a moratorium  on principal  repayments  by the 
Philippines,  and led to the resignation  of the central bank  governor and an 
audit of the central bank’s books. 
The central  bank  negotiated  its  last consortium loan  in March  1983 for 
$300  million.  The terms  of  this  loan  were  more  severe than  the previous 
consortium loan in 1982, and a substantial portion of the loan was tied to the 
U.S prime rate instead of the London interbank offer rate for dollar deposits 
(LIBOR). At  the  same time  in  early  1983 the Philippines  was  borrowing 
frantically  short  term,  almost  at  whatever  spreads  were  quoted,  despite 
seemingly substantial reserves, and many banks, sensing that something was 
wrong,  cut  back  their  short-term  exposure  to  the  country.  The  Aquino 
assassination on August  15 created a rush of anxiety about the country, and 
when  the  Philippines  declared  a  moratorium  in  October,  reserves  were 
practically exhausted. 
The initial impression among commercial banks after the moratorium was 
that the rescheduling process for the Philippines would be the easiest to date 
and achieved very quickly. The announcement of the reserves overstatement 521  Philippinesichapter 6 
Table 6.12  Central Bank Reserves (in millions of  U.S. dollars) 
As 
Originally  (Month’s  After  (Month’s 
















































































































Source:  Central hank, Annual Report, and Philippine Financial Statistics. 
‘Defined  using total goods and services imports from the previous year. 
shattered  this  optimism and  poisoned  and  atmosphere between  the  Philip- 
pines and the banks and the Fund. External confidence in the Philippines had 
largely  been  confidence  in  the  technocrats,  and  with  the  discovery  of  the 
reserves  overstatement  this  trust  vanished.  The  negotiation  process  was 
lengthened  greatly  by  the audit of  central  bank  accounts that  the creditors 
required  and  by  the  verification  that  followed  almost  every  Philippine 
presentation of  information.  l3 522  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
6.4  The Debt Management System 
During the  1970s and  1980s the Philippines  had in place one of the best 
debt  management  and  information  systems among  LDC borrowers.  Data 
collected  by  MEDIAD provided  a  reasonably  complete  view  of  external 
indebtedness,  although  it  was  somewhat weak  on  short-term borrowings, 
particularly  those of  the banking  sector. The foreign  loan approval  system 
gave the government the tools to control the level of outstanding debt and to 
influence  terms and maturities.  The remaining  area of  debt management  is 
what  might be termed  macro coordination, information  on the demand for 
additional  foreign  capital  implicit  in  domestic  budget  and  investment 
decisions, and  decisions  about  what  amount of  additional  foreign  finance 
was prudent for the country. A presidential directive in  1978 established the 
Investment  Coordinating  Committee  (ICC),  headed  by  the  minister  of 
finance and  including  the  central bank  governor,  the minister  of  planning 
(NEDA),  the  minister  of  the  budget,  and  the  head  of  the  BOI.  Project 
proposals of over P.  300 million  were examined by  a subcommittee of  the 
ICC, and a second subcommittee prepared a foreign resources budget for the 
country. l4 
The debt  management  system of  the  Philippines  was  successful  in  the 
1970s in  limiting  access to the external  loans market  and in  lengthening 
maturities,  reducing  interest  rates,  and  refinancing  existing foreign loans. 
However, the system was not successful in preventing the sharp deterioration 
of  the Philippine debt position in the early 1980s. In particular,  it was unable 
to prevent a very rapid accumulation  of short-term debt that raised the debt 
servicing burden  and  left the country  vulnerable  to shifts  in domestic and 
external confidence. 
While the Philippines had all the elements of successful debt management 
in  place,  there  were  weaknesses  in  the  operation  of  the  system.  The 
information gathering of  MEDIAD concentrated  on medium-  and long-term 
debt. The monitoring of short-term debt was less complete, particularly  for 
trade credits, and MEDIAD did not have responsibility for short-term debt of 
the banking  sector.  Short-term foreign loans to entities outside the banking 
sector  required  central  bank  approval,  but  approval  was  given  to  public 
sector corporations to borrow  up to certain ceilings rather than approval on 
individual loans.15 In the early 1980s the central bank was unable to enforce 
those  ceilings,  leading  to  several  directives  and  a  presidential  letter  of 
instruction strengthening controls on short-term borrowing  in  1983. 
While  the  institutions  for  macro  coordination  existed,  they  were  not 
effective. The ICC failed to adequately screen and rank proposals to borrow; 
ICC approvals greatly exceeded ceilings on available foreign borrowing. In 
addition,  the  discretionary  authority  that  existed  under  martial  law 
undermined the review and control process. Presidential letters of instruction 
could  supercede  the review  process  and grant foreign  borrowing  approval, 523  Philippines/Chapter 6 
and in the later years of martial law there was a greater tendency to preempt 
the existing review and regulatory mechanism, not just in foreign borrowing, 
but throughout the economic policy process. 
Nor was external conditionality effective in limiting the growth of external 
debt. Ceilings on external borrowing were a part of every IMF program that 
the Philippines undertook, beginning with the extended facility in  1976. In 
1982, the one year in which the Philippines did not have an IMF program, 
the Philippine authorities set reduced limits on external borrowings,  and in 
1983 set limits that were lower than those contained in the IMF program.  In 
each case the ceilings contained in the IMF program or set by the Philippine 
authorities were met. However, the ceilings applied only to loans of one- to 
twelve-year  maturities  (with  subceilings  for  one to five  years)  and  not  to 
short-term loans. 
The  second  factor  favoring  short-term  borrowing  was  the  debt  service 
ratio  contained  in  Philippine  statutes.  It  is difficult  to determine  to  what 
extent the Philippine authorities or their external creditors were misled by the 
stability  of  the statutory debt  service ratio,  but there  is no question that it 
influenced the behavior of Philippine policymakers  as the ratio approached 
its ceiling in the early  1980s. What  the  statutory  ratio did not include was 
short-term revolving credit, which was the overwhelming part of short-term 
nonmonetary debt. Revolving credit outstanding increased sharply during the 
1980s,  particularly  to  public  sector  enterprises.  In  addition,  the  ratio  of 
revolving credit outstanding to trade flows being financed increased  sharply, 
indicating  that these credits were being used  for general financial purposes 
and not simply for trade finance. 
What  comes  out  of  this  review  is  that  the  character  of  the  debt 
management  and  control  process,  coupled  with  the  willingness  of  the 
Philippines to sidestep, but not violate, its limits, greatly weakened the debt 
position  of the Philippines,  making the country more vulnerable to external 
shocks and shifts of  confidence. 
The Philippines in this period also illustrates a more widespread tendency 
not to make hard policy decisions until those decisions are effectively forced 
by  events. Philippine  policymakers  considered  declaring  a  moratorium  in 
late  1982,  but  then  balked  after  the  announcement  of  the  Mexican  debt 
situation."  Bankers  from  some  of  the  major  foreign  banks  in  Manila 
approached  the  government  early  in  1983,  advising  that  the  Philippines 
declare a moratorium and ask for a rescheduling of its external debts, but the 
country instead decided to try to ride out its difficulties.I7 In addition to its 
international reserve,  the central bank had a standby line of credit, arranged 
in the  1970s, of $450 million  that it could have used, but never did. When 
the moratorium was finally declared on 17 October  1983, foreign exchange 
reserves were extremely low, and as a result the foreign exchange allocation 
process that followed was extremely severe. 